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I.
When Perry Miller, the great intellectual historian, died suddenly
in 1963 at the age of 58, he left behind him fragments of a massive,
comprehensive study of the American mind from the Revolution to
the outbreak of the Civil War. Of nine projected parts, two and a por-
tion of the third have been published in one volume.1 Book II of this
volume, The Legal Mentality, contains Professor Miller's judgment
on the intellectual life of American law. Publication of an essay on
the intellectual side of the law by an author of high prestige is a major
-and rare-event in American legal historiography. On the whole,
'however, this is a disappointing work. It has a certain grandeur of de-
sign, a certain beauty of style, but it is disfigured by many errors of
fact2 and more significantly by its strained and strange view of Ameri-
can law and the legal profession. Some errors would no doubt have
been corrected had the author lived. Others, however, are more funda-
mental errors in deep-seated premises, errors that infuse the entire
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. BA. 1948, J.D. 1951, LL.M. 1953, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
1. P. MILLER, THE LFE OF THE MIND IN AmERIC, FROi THE R EVOLUTION TO Tile CIVIL
WAR (1965) [hereinafter cited as THE LIFE OF THE MIND].
2. For example, a discussion of equity, id. 171-182, consistently confuses the various
senses in which this complex legal word is used. Professor Miller also states that "[1)n
the colonies, such controversies as in mid-eighteeenth century England were finding their
way to Chancery usually had to be adjudicated, if at all, by the legislatures." Id. 171.
This ignores the fact that some colonies (Such as South Carolina) had fully'developed
Chancery courts; moreover, some jurisdictions enforced in their ordinary courts what
would be elsewhere labeled equitable claims.
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work. I shall attempt to set forth Professor Miller's approach to Ameri-
can legal history, to state frankly why I think it is wrong, and then to
suggest alternative ways of looking at the same field.
II.
Professor Miller, of course, is an intellectual historian. The actual
content of the legal system is not his concern; his subject, rather is
the development of legal ideas and their relationship to other aspects
of American intellectual life.3 He finds the substance of American
legal thought in works of formal jurisprudence and in the speeches
and treatises of important lawyers. Professor Miller, however, was not
a lawyer. His vast erudition did not extend to such technical legal
material as case reports and statutes. His research was generally limited
to the study of formal texts of leading or archetypical jurists; on these
he bases his generalizations. He then compares his jurisprudential find-
ings with other data, drawn in the same manner from formal writings
in other fields, such as religion and literature. His findings are further
compared with his conceptions of the "American character" or the
"American mind," which is in turn a composite of or an abstraction
from the- legal mind, the literary mind, the revivalist mind, and the
scientific mind.
Any scholar must be granted the right to choose his own subject,
and the intellectual historian has the right to deal solely with products
of the intellect if he desires. He may treat his subject in relative iso-
lation; though society is a seamless web, it is neither necessary, nor
even possible, to take fully into account the railroad and the cotton
gin in dealing with Emerson and Poe. But it is another thing entirely
when an intellectual (or social, or economic) historian claims for his
subject matter and his concepts that they alone explain what makes
and moves the world.4 To blame Auschwitz and Buchenwald exclu-
sively or even largely on Nietzsche or Wagner would be blatantly
untrue to the science of society. Judgments of causation are slippery at
best. Many slight or invisible ropes bind and loose the social order;
present knowledge of causation is too embryonic to unravel them.
3. THE LEGAL MIND IN AsmacA, FROM INDEPNEIENCE TO THE Cmi. WAR 11 (iler ed.,
1962). This was a collection of documents edited by Professor Miller, with brief e-mays
introducing each selection.
4. John Higham wrote, almost prophetically, in 1951 that Miller seemed "chiefly con-
cerned with estimating the force of ideas themselves. There are dangers in this enterprie
-dangers of assuming the autonomy of ideas and losing oneself in abstractions." Higham,
The Rise of American Intellectual History, 56 Am. HIsT. Rrv. 470 (1951).
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Whether the Civil War was in essence a culture conflict, a moral cru-
sade, the working out of blind economic forces, or all of these in some
specific mix, or something entirely different, is beyond our capacity
to determine.
Professor Miller can and does contribute to understanding when
he confines himself to the intellectual life of his society, considered as
a set of circles of literary effort which overlap or surround each other
and are in turn collectively enclosed in one grand circle of American
thought. Unfortunately, however, he goes further. Throughout the
section on the legal mind, he makes assertions which are, explicitly or
not, assertions of causal connections between intellectual developments
and socio-econoniic events. These go beyond his data and frequently
offend against common sense. Moreover, his boldest leaps are concealed
by a highly metaphoric style, so that the reader is apt to follow along,
dazzled into agreement, unless he stops to analyze each phrase.
III.
Let us first take an example of the kind of general argument that
Professor Miller makes. The "mass of the People," he says, distrusted
the law in the post-revolutionary period. This was because law was "by
its very nature sophisticated, whereas the American people" were "nat-
ural, reasonable, equitable." 5 The lawyers' "real controversy with their
society was that they stood for the Head against the Heart." Though
great courtroom "romantics" appeared later on in the century, Ameri-
can legal thought remained intellectually committed to the forces of
cold reason. The legal profession bent every effort to the pursuit of
reason and to the creating, out of its rude past, of an intellectual pro-
fession and a rational system of law. The mind of the lawyers differed
from the revivalist mind (the subject of Book I of the volume), which
dreamed of creating in America "a distinct, unique millenial utopia."
The lawyers sought rather to "subject the society to a rule of univer-
sality," that is, to the dominance of the (supranational) common law.
Partly because of this basic intellectual posture, the lawyers-exempli-
fied by such men as James Kent, Joseph Story, and John Marshall-
constituted a highly conservative element in society. They fought to
preserve the property qualification; they fought against the elective
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judiciary. The "conservative" bar, we are told, "trembled" at the equa-
tion of the elective principle with democracy.8 To them, elected judges
meant the rule of the mob, the dethronement of reason, the triumph
of "instinct."
The reader will note that the molding of opinion on specific, con-
crete policies (appointive judgeships, the property qualification) is
explained by the logical relationship between these positions and a
more general intellectual position. That, for example, certain lawyers
might want to preserve the rule of the rich because they themselves
were relatively rich seems not to have entered Professor Miller's mind.
Moreover, Professor Miller thinks it makes sense to speak of the legal
profession as a whole. To him, the profession represents a distinct stra-
tum of society, with a distinctive frame of mind. That frame of mind,
of course, is the one he senses peering out of the pages of formal legal
texts. At least he is consistent; he generalizes no less glibly about so-
ciety as a whole:
The populace in general, however, were strongly of the opinion
that if there were to be lawyers at all, those who worked by instinct
were the most tolerable.9
Neither here nor, of course, anywhere else does Professor Miller tell
us how he knows what the "populace in general" thought about this
or any other subject. The passage is based on evidence drawn solely
from the writings of some articulate portion of the public. Thus there
are two weaknesses in the argument: first, a sort of intellectual deter-
minism; second, the drawing of conclusions that go far beyond the data.
Not that the methodological puzzle is easily solved. It may seem
plausible to assume that most lawyers objected to the elective principle
for judges and the broadening of the suffrage. But how can we prove
it? There is no historical equivalent of the Gallup poll. We must settle
for the best available evidence. But how shall we gather it? How much
weight shall we place on a speech by Chancellor Kent? Was he a leader?
Who listened to him? How many prominent leaders spoke on the other
side? Who listened to them? Is there any way of finding out what less
prominent lawyers thought? Of course these are hard questions, per-
haps even impossible ones. But a historian of opinion owes his audience
some rigor, some attention to methodology. Professor Miller's book
not only fails to solve these problems, it seems barren of any awareness
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We could forgive a lack of journeyman's rigor if instead we gained
flashes of insight that no dull empiricism could hope for. And there
are such flashes of insight, here and there. Unfortunately, we also find
great expanses of vague metaphor, papering over a basic hollowness of
argument. For example, in one passage, dealing with the appointment
of Joseph Story to a chair at Harvard Law School, we read that when
Story
joined to the crushing burden of his work... the labor of teach-
ing at Harvard, his prestige made the Law School a national insti-
tution. From this point on may be dated the rapid growth ... of
law schools, so that by mid-century the time when a youth could
set up as a lawyer merely by reading Blackstone in the office of
the local practitioner was fast becoming a thing of what seemed a
distant past .... 10
What do we learn here? No doubt, Story's prestige was important to
Harvard (let us leave aside what it means to say that his prestige "made"
the Law School a "national institution"). According to Miller there
seems to have been some connection between the growing prestige of
Harvard and the decline of the apprenticeship method. Plausible per-
haps: but precisely what was the connection? Professor Miller does
not quite say that there was a connection, or of what sort; he merely
says that the new development "may be dated" from the appointment
of Story to his professorship-a baffling ambiguity. What is the mech-
anism which made Story's appointment crucial for Harvard and made
the rise of Harvard a crucial factor in inducing radical change in the
aims and methods of American legal education? One might guess that
legal training and admission to the bar were affected by changes in the
economics and social status of the bar, that these changes were con-
nected with general trends in the professionalization of American occu-
pational groups, and that these trends were in turn connected with
gross changes in the economy, population, and society of the United
States. Not a word, or a hint of these factors is to be found in The Life
of the Mind. The passage on Story, typically, takes us to some distant
realm where only disembodied thought exists. And even in that sphere
the argument moves by poetry and allusion. On close inspection, the
bones of the argument turn to water. Nor can we save the argument
by calling Story's appointment not a cause but a landmark or symbol
-an occurrence which may be taken as a dramatic outward manifes-
10. Id. 142. Story was appointed to a professorship established at Harvard by Nathan
Dane in 1829. 1 C. WAmumz, HI"oRY oF THE HARvARD LAW ScHOOL 415-18 (1904).
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tation, an external stigma of deep silent forces or events, The trouble
is that Professor Miller does not treat it as such; at best he equivocates
between the symbolic and causal planes. And his metaphors serve not
to illuminate, but to hide the vacillation between these two levels of
analysis.
The same vacillation recurs throughout the text. One page away
from the passage about Story is an even more blatant example. Theo-
philus Parsons, we are told, "sadly" noted in 1852 two great streams
of opinion in the bar-one, that legal scholars must turn to speciali-
zation, the other, that law, "like all true sciences, springs from a few
simple principles which can readily be acquired."" It made Parsons
"melancholy" to realize that the specialist view was on the rise. Pro-
fessor Miller here adds his own view:
The behemoths of legal scholarship had overreached themselves.
They had created so massive an engine of rational erudition that
the intellects of ordinary American students could not keep up
with it.2
Now the historical problem under discussion is what was the origin
of specialization in the study and practice of law. Are we really to
believe that this phenomenon owes anything-let alone everything-
to "behemoths of legal scholarship" who created an "engine of rational
erudition" too "massive" for the "intellects of ordinary American stu-
dents?" Is specialization in medicine, the sciences, and history to be
blamed on "behemoths" who "overreached themselves" in their philo-
sophical writings? The increasing bulk of American law was due more
to population growth, economic development, and social diversity than
to "behemoths." If anything, "legal scholarship" was struggling to re-
duce the enormous burden of raw legal matter to practical, manageable
form. This bulk was one reason why Parsons longed for a skeleton
key of simple principles. Professor Miller speaks as if scholars created
specialization at the bar by pushing legal erudition past the point of
easy grasp. There is a grain of truth in the argument, but only a grain.
No lawyer could grasp the whole of the legal system because the system
.became simply too big. Its size, however, owed nothing to Story and
-Kent and everything to social and economic events which Professor
11. The reader will be immediately reminded here of Langdell's famous passage:
"Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines.... Mhe num-
ber of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed." C. LA.c-
DELL, CAsM ON CoNTmm.Ars vi (1871).
12. THE LFE OF THE MIND 142-143.
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Miller entirely ignores. Moreover, professional specialization is a re-
sponse to market demands. There is a patent bar and a tax bar because
these are needed; nobody wants a bailments bar.
By ignoring the world in which the legal profession worked, Pro-
fessor Miller constantly misses the point, even in the intellectual his-
tory of law. Here is a prime example:
... the accumulated weight of... tomes ... rolled through the
decades before the Civil War like a juggernaut. Hoffman's lec-
tures and the volumes of Kent and Story were reinforced by other
classics of what Roscoe Pound calls "doctrinal writings:" Reve's
Baron and Feme (1816), Gould's Pleading (1832), Greenleaf's Evi-
dence (1842-1843), Parson's Contracts (1853-1855), Washburn's
Real Property (1860-1862), to mention only the most ponderous.
Against the whimpering protests of beginners who felt that all
they need know was American statute, such overpowering figures
as Thomas Sergeant of Philadelphia patiently explained that these
treatises were indispensable.... [T]hey shed upon the law a light
of order.13
The first thing we notice about the passage is its maddening impreci-
sion: what, if anything, does it mean to say that the accumulated weight
of these "tomes ... -rolled through the decades . . . like a juggernaut?"
In what respect were the treatises mentioned the "most ponderous"
of pre-Civil War treatises? Professor Miller has probably never really
read these books and compared them with others which he found less
"ponderous." In what respect was Thomas Sergeant an "overpowering
figure"? Few readers will have heard of this minor figure in American
legal history.' 4 In the second place, the passage is sublimely innocent
of law and life. Legal neophytes, whether of the whimpering sort or
not, surely had heard of the common law. They surely knew that stat-
utes were not the whole of the law. A naive student might have thought
the matter was the other way around. Moreover, there is the innuendo,
quite characteristic of Professor Miller's thought, that the "ponderous"
tomes were exercises in pure legal logic and that they were somehow
imposed on the helpless young, mesmerizing them despite their "whim-
pering" complaints. Nothing could be more fanciful. The simple fact
is that these treatises were written to make money. Nathan Dane fi-
nanced Story's chair at Harvard out of the proceeds of his multi-volume
13. Id. 156-7.
14. Thomas Sergeant (1782-1860) is probably remembered, if at all, for his reports of
cases decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which he edited in collaboration with
William Rawle. He also served as a justice on that court from 1884 to 1846, and wrote
a number of treatises. 16 DICTIONARY OF AmmEcAN BiOGRAnIY 590 (1935).
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pot-boiler.' 5 Lawyers were hungry for plain, useful texts. They did not
buy these books for philosophy. The books indeed contained no philos-
ophy, but only a thin soup of borrowed notions served up with the
meat and potatoes of law. Lawyers bought these books for the same
reason then that they buy them today: to help them in study or prac-
tice. The "light of order" shed by these books was pragmatic in con-
ception and execution. Some of them were as severely practical as a
form-book; others discussed the "principles" underlying particular
rules of law and made some attempt to harmonize cases and isolate
exceptions to the rules.' 6 In general, the impact of legal treatises on
the intellectual life of their readers (Kent and Story were perhaps par-
tial exceptions) was probably not much more than the intellectual
impact of the Sears Roebuck catalog on farmers.
IV.
In short, Professor Miller constantly romanticizes and exaggerates
the impact of formal intellect on the habits and achievements of the
law. The "sublimity" of legal literature-such as it was-probably
meant next to nothing in the life of the average lawyer. In the absence
of more hard facts, one may also gently doubt whether the jurispru-
dential elites had quite as much and as baneful an influence on Ameri-
can politics as Professor Miller seems to suggest. As we have seen, he
equates his post-revolutionary lawyers with classical rationalism, with
Head rather than Heart, and with conservatism and revulsion against
democracy. To him the work of the lawyers was "negative." They in-
herited and cherished an ancient system of law, which had been deci-
sively formed in a struggle against the power of the English crown.
Well into the era of independence, the lawyers continued to be deeply
suspicious of power. They were fearful of government-particularly
a government ruled by the mob. America, a "hard-working, pushing
society," "appeared headed for catastrophe" in its race to achieve popu-
lar democracy.' 7 The lawyers fought manfully against the evils of their
15. See 1 C. WAPIN, HORY oF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 415 (1903).
16. Here is an example from Tapping Reeve's Baron and Feine, one of Professor
Miller's "ponderous" tomes: "Sons-in-law are not obliged to maintain the pauper parents
of their wives. This case is an exception to the rule [that husbands can be compelled to
perform duties incumbent on the wife prior to her marriage]; for before marriage the
wives were obliged by law (if the) were of sufficient ability) to maintain their necessitous
parents. It is not very easy to discover the principle which governs this exception to the
general rule. Perhaps it consists in an anxious desire to preserve domestic tranquilit),
which might be endangered by the operation of the general rule." T. RUV, B].-no; AND
FEzam 75 (1816).
17. THE I= oF THE M ND 215.
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times. Professor Miller thinks it is "fair" to say that the "tremendous
concern of the legal generation of 1820 to 1850 for the imposition of
negatives upon the emerging society is largely responsible for the great
esteem the principle has subsequently enjoyed." '
Much of this argument is more or less plausible. But the final hy-
pothesis is far too sweeping. No doubt there is some connection
between doctrines and tactics employed by appellate courts before the
Civil War (Dred Scott is a hideous example) and the conservatism of
the due process cases in the late nineteenth century.19 Cooley, Tiede-
man, and the other postwar theorists of constitutional limitations used
prewar case law and theory in constructing their manifestoes against
popular democracy.2 0 But movements generate manifestoes; manifes.
toes do not make movements. The "great esteem" enjoyed in this coun-
try by principles of limitation on the power of the government is not
a matter of esthetic tastes and only partly a matter of ideological con-
viction. Limitations on government cannot be fully understood with-
out reference to specific economic and social struggles in which prin-
ciples of limitation were asserted. They cannot be summed up in so
pat a formula as Professor Miller suggests, and they cannot be treated
as a closed system of theories explainable as dialectic developments
from earlier ideas and dialectic ancestors of later ones. The "negatives"
imposed on a Populist legislature, on King George III, on the Congress
of the nineteenth century, and on a white supremacist city council
today are not the same either in theory or in context, and it is wrong
to treat them as the same.
The point about negativism is all glitter and no gold in another
sense, too. Here is Professor Miller again: "Oddly enough, all Mar-
shall's great decisions were aimed at striking something down, whether
a state or the administration. Whatever may have been his inward
dreams of empire, what he most notably did as a jurist was to prevent
people from acting."21 A curious way to characterize this great and
varied careerl Moreover, every time Marshall prevented one side in
a law suit from acting, by the same token he allowed the other side to
have its way. Every lawsuit is a clash of interests; no lawsuit can have
purely negative results. Perhaps Professor Miller is speaking of some
18. Sd. 216.
19. See CLYDE JACODS, LAW WRITERS AND TI COURT (1954).
20. T. COOLEy, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF TE AMEICAN UNION (1868); C. TEiAN,
LmIrrATIONS OF POLcE PowER (1886).
21. THE LwE OF THE MIND 219.
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specific kind of negation or "prevention"--but what is it? Restrictions
on state government meant more freedom for the federal government
or for the entrepreneur. In a new government, institutional boundaries
needed definition; economic and political consequences flowed from
jurisdictional decisions. The courts mapped borders of authority be-
tween the states, between state and federal governments, between pri-
vate citizens and various levels of government, between competing in-
terest groups, and between-the judiciary and other branches of govern-
ment. This work was as much positive and creative as it was negative
and restrictive. As Professor Miller elsewhere concedes, American law
and government in all its branches served the cause of rapid, unfettered
economic development, which nineteenth century policy-makers felt
was the best road to the common good, and which seemed to serve best
the interests of that broad class of literate freeholders who mattered in
society. Thus the aim of law and policy was the release of economic
energy, as Hurst has argued;22 not negation, but the creation of a frame-
work of order that might maximize desirable economic growth. And
this goal of growth was not held merely by an intellectual elite (law
and layman) but widely shared among the mass of the people, insofar
as can be judged by their habits, expressions, and work.
V.
But perhaps enough has been said about Professor Miller's data,
methods, and general point of view. He has at least raised a question
about the character of American legal thought in the post-revolution-
ary period; and the influence of that thought on the legal system. His
general verdict is highly laudatory: though conservative, American
jurists producd a powerful system of legal thought. For this reason,
and despite some conspicuous failures and omissions, a brilliantly
adaptive legal system developed.
Another less laudatory view of American jurisprudence and law can
be plausibly advanced. As to jurisprudence in the strict sense, most
scholars would agree that precious little in the post-revolutionary pe-
riod was worthy of the name. Kent's Commentaries, for example, were
modeled on Blackstone's; like Blackstone's, they were extremely useful
to American lawyers,2 were clearly organized, well written and imbued
22. j. HumT, LAw AD TEm CoNDrroNs OF FREEDO IN mm NzLw'm. -ChrunY
UrnMIT STATES (1956).
23. James Kent's Commentaries on American Law were first published in 4 volumes
from 1826 to 1830, were enormously successful, and went through many editions. The
standard biography of Kent is J. HoRTON, JAmzs KENT, A S"onv IN Cot;sEnvATLs. (1939).
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with much good sense. But Kent was not a great systematic thinker,
and he did not pretend to be. Nor is there any depth or system to the
rather pedantic prose of Joseph Story. There was political genius in
America; the Federalist papers are proof of that. But the reason, system,
and logic that Professor Miller somehow sees in windy prefaces and
orations hardly seem worthy of his praise. Perhaps after years of read-
ing sermons, even the prose of the lawyers appeared profound.
There is no reason for surprise in the lack of a great jurisprudential
school in the early days of the republic. In the common law system,
systematic legal thought does not serve as an authoritative guide to
legal action. Cases and enactments make law; scholars do not, or, if
they try to, they hide the fact. Therefore there was no need for a system
of jurisprudence, and none sprang up. The common law countries
were weak in philosophy of law. Legal writing was abundant, and abun-
dantly welcomed, to be sure; but only because of the need for practical
guides and shortcuts toward mastery of the empirical tools of the trade.
The great value of Kent and Story was that they helped lawyers func.
tion in their jobs. Story's erudition, his civil law learning, his quota-
tions from French and Latin jurists--these were of secondary value if
not a downright nuisance. They lent tone to the works and did not
unduly detract from the practical merits. But the utility of Story lay
in the fact that he provided arguments, raw materials, models, guides
-often in fields of law that had been poorly explored or were in
process of rapid growth. His was merely a higher form of an art exem-
plified also in the hundreds of manuals and practice-books which were
published or circulated in manuscript.
This is not to say that a formal jurisprudential system serves no func-
tion in a common-law jurisdiction. Such a system shows that a profes-
sion is mature and worthy of honor; that it is not a lowly trade, but
is founded rather upon a body of independent non-self-evident prin-
ciples. The layman must undergo specialized training before he can
grasp the meaning of the science, let alone practice the art. Skills and
learning therefore legitimize the claim of the profession to a monopoly
of the work within the field of professional competence. The develop-
ment of an occupational group, clearly demarcated from the lay public,
and concerned with professional status, may be a likely prerequisite to
the development of a school of formal jurisprudential thought. This
does not mean that lawyers, in any culture, consciously sit down to
create a formal jurisprudence to be used as a weapon in their struggle
for legitimacy and economic power; but it does mean that the develop.
ment of a jurisprudence is most likely to occur under such conditions.
1254
Book Reviews
Is the "sublime" then to be looked for, not in the literature of law,
but in the law itself-in the creation of a sound legal order, well-suited
to the American condition? Such a claim would have a surface plausi-
bility. The claim would be that the practical work of judges like Kent,
John Marshall, Lemuel Shaw, John Gibson, and hundreds of well-
known and anonymous members of the bar produced a craftsmanlike
American law. A proper assessment of such a claim would require
close attention to precisely those source materials which Professor
Miller omits: the case law, statute law, and working lawyers' files of
the day. Moreover, though research would illuminate all sorts of dark
pages in our legal history, it could not tell us whether or not our law
was exceptionally adaptive. Against what criterion is adaptability to
be measured? Can we agree upon the identity of other, maladaptive
legal systems?
In general, a system of law suitable to the condition of its own society
is no novelty in human history; it is, if anything, a constant. A legal
system must respond to the needs of its time and its society. When one
speaks of a legal system as out of tune with its society, one is usually
referring to quite a different phenomenon: a conflict between parts of
society or specific interest groups in which the legal system, or some
specialized institution, responds to or reflects some interests but not
others. To state, for example, that judges of the late nineteenth cen-
tury who issued labor injunctions and voided welfare legislation were
out of step with their society or unresponsive to social needs is simply
to take the victor's view of history. These judges were out of step with
a growing, powerful social movement; but their decisions were enun-
ciated in cases brought or defended by real litigants with real economic
and social interests. 2 4 A decision is an act of taking sides; one side
may be ethically preferable to the other, but both sides represent social
interests of some kind. A highly ritualized system of procedure-the
medieval common law may be an example-might more plausibly be
accused of disharmony with all social needs (other than those of legal
professionals). But even here one must ask why society could and did
tolerate what other societies, both "primitive" and "advanced," have
found and do find utterly intolerable.
If it is sublime, therefore, to manufacture a working system of law,
then any process is sublime-the development of American slang, or
the decline of barge traffic when the railroads were built. Of course
24. For this thesis, see Friedman and Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Indus.
trial Accidents, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 50, 72-77 (1967).
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the legal system had capacity for growth. All legal systems that are
worthy of the name do. Legal systems do not "atrophy," except in
the eyes of scholars who are watching closely the decline of one part
or institution while another part or institution grows. Courts and legis-
latures may atrophy, but if their society continues to survive, some
other institutions must carry on the functions they once performed.
The work of social control must go on. A legal system is "great" if its
society is great or if it takes a form such that other societies find it
useful for their own purposes. The common law system is great chiefly
in the former sense. It is the system that pertains to a major society.
It is the system that governs legal relations in a number of countries
which have become rich, populous, and powerful-the countries of
the British Commonwealth and the United States. This fact is its chief
claim to greatness, just as the chief claim of the English language to
greatness is its vast utility in a world where millions of people-and
members of dominant cultures-speak English. Of course English vo-
cabulary is richer than that of, say, Icelandic or Manx. But this richness
is a consequence of the numerical, political, and cultural strength of
the speakers of English, and not vice versa. A Shakespeare is statistically
more probable in a major population group. Or if a Shakespeare arises
in what is or turns out to be a major society, he is that much more
likely to be recognized as such. A great Nepali or Samoyed poet, if
one exists, is not likely to ever get his due. And the major cultures
define the standards of greatness.
A legal system acts in much the same way. As its society develops, it
develops to6; like language, it is a tool of culture, and it is static or
dynamic when its culture is. There was nothing sublime or particu-
larly praiseworthy in the development of railroad law in the United
States. Railroads bring on railroad law, in one way or another, just
as they bring on a railroad vocabulary. The new law may be borrowed
from outside, made up of existing native materials, or enacted rela-
tively fresh; it may take the form of case law evolution, executive de-
cree, ratification of private arrangements by governmental authority,
administrative manipulation, or any or all of these-all depending upon
the nature and state of the legal culture. But in any event railroad law
must come to be. If some institutions (such as the courts) prove inca-
pable of handling the emerging functions of railroad law, then legiti.
mized private arrangements, or statute law, or administrative law will
fill the gap.
American legal institutions were, moreover, quite accustomed to
the process of the adaptation of law to changed conditions; complex
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methods of new ordering for old arrangements had been systematically
explored during the Colonial period. The sudden flowering of Ameri-
can law in the early nineteenth century-Roscoe Pound's "formative
period"-is a myth, or at best a gross exaggeration, as Stanley Katz
has recently pointed out.25 The Revolutionary War did not bring
about total disruption of the legal system, nor necessitate a wholly new
start. Colonial law was a long, rich process of adaptation of old law
to new ends, and invention of new law to suit colonial conditions.20
The process of adaptation continued, unabated, after the Revolution.
VI.
Something remains to be said about the legal profession, the pos-
sessor of that "mind" which has so preoccupied Professor Miller. As
we have mentioned, Professor Miller draws his data almost exclusively
from the literary remains of a small group of eminent jurists. The
same names constantly recur in the book-notably Joseph Story, James
Kent, David Hoffman. That the writings of these men reflect the
"mind" of the profession requires a bold evidentiary leap, especially
in the light of the extraordinary diversity and range of the profession.
For one thing, there were no significant barriers to entry into the
profession. Very little training was required of a man who decided to
set himself up as a lawyer. The "training" of such eminent men as
John Marshall, Alexander Hamilton, Abraham Lincoln-and of thou-
sands of others less eminent-was brief, almost perfunctory.2 7 Young
lawyers started out their careers with nothing more than a few months
spent with Blackstone, some exposure to copy-work in a law office, and
perhaps some few months of practical training under a senior member
of the bar. Nowhere did the state, the courts, or the organized bar suc-
ceed in making rigorous training a prerequisite to practice, or set up
meaningful threshold examinations to control the quality or quantity
of men entering the bar.28 In general, American lawyers did not form
a cohesive self-governing occupational group, and nobody governed
25. S. Katz, Book Review, 53 U. CHL L. REv. 867 (1966).
26. Some notion of the range of current scholarly opinion on colonial law can be
gathered from LAw AD Aurnoarry iN COLONiAL A!rmmncA (G. Billias ed., 965).
27. On Marshall, who read Blackstone and attended law lectures at William and Mary
College, see 1 A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MIARSHALL 154, 161, 174-76 (1929); on Hamilton.
see 1 THE LAw PRACIICE OF ALEXA'DER HA. IrON 47-49 (. Goebel ed. 1964); on Lincoln,
see J. DuFF, A. LINcoLN, PRAmm LAwYER 3-34 (1960).
28. See generally A. REm, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLC PROFESSION OF Tim LA, (1921),
still the best treatment of legal education and controls over admission to the bar in the
nineteenth century.
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them from above. Professional organizations hardly existed before the
Civil War; the New York City Bar Association was founded in 1870,
the American Bar Association in 1878.29 Until the organized bar grad-
ually gained strength and succeeded in imposing standards on the pro-
fession and in the law schools, the profession was enormously fluid
and open-ended.
Precisely because it was so easy to pass oneself off as a lawyer in the
early nineteenth century, the conventional picture of an unstratified,
homogenous bar must be regarded with suspicion. Lawyers were pro-
fessionally a less diversified lot than they are today, of course, but the
bar was stratified nonetheless. The professional life of a man like
Alexander Hamilton at the height of his career was fundamentally
different from that of a struggling small-town lawyer, in exactly the
ways in which one might expect. Hamilton had rich clients, who
brought him complex and lucrative matters. The small-town lawyer
had petty clients; he collected debts, searched titles, handled minor
contract and criminal litigation; perhaps he dabbled in real estate or
ran for local office. Before the Civil War virtually all lawyers had court-
room experience-a record which today's bar could scarcely claim;
yet most of these lawyers practiced before local courts, while only a
famous few argued great cases before the United States Supreme Court.
Cases of ocean trade went to sophisticated seaport lawyers; small law-
yers of the plains replevied cows. 0
Along with business, land speculation, and politics, the practice of
law was an avenue to social mobility. Anybody with intelligence and
ambition could aspire to become a lawyer. Young men with nerve and
energy often tried their hand at the law; many failed and drifted out
into other lines of work. Others stayed on and made money, or used
law as a stepping-stone to political or business success. Towns on the
frontier of settlements attracted swarms of young lawyers on the make.
Some were ignorant charlatans; others were men of ability and even
of culture.3' The bar was diverse in talent and crowded with fortune-
seekers because the door to the bar was wide open.
29. On the founding of the American Bar Association, see E. SUNDERL.AND, HSTORY OFs
THE A ME CAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 3ff. (1953); on the founding of the Bar
Association of the City of New York, see H. TAFT, A CENTURY AND A HALF AT TIlE NEW
YoRK BAR 147-50 (1938).
30. Compare the description of the career of R. M. Blatchford, in 1 R. SWAINE, Til
CRAVATH FIRat AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819-1947, at 14-15 (1946), with the description of
Lincoln's early practice in Duff, supra note 28, at 62ff.
31. For a vigorous picture of the charlatans of the frontier bar see J. BALDWIN, F tUsI
TIms OF ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI (1853). For more balanced, if less entertaining pictures
see W. ENGLISH, THE PIONEER LAWYER AND JURIST IN MisoSri (1947); W. HAMILTON, AN-
GLO-AmtEicAN LAW OF THE FRONTIER: THOmAS RODNEY AND His TERRurORIAL CASES (195 ),
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In the United States, an enormous number of people had a voice
in the social order as owners of capital, voters, churchgoers, citizens,
shapers and snarers of significant opinion. A broad-based middle-class
society was evolving-and it was paralleled by a broad-based middle-
class legal profession. Freedom of entry meant a great quantity of law-
yers, some good, some bad, some cheap, and some expensive. Many
jobs that lawyers were willing to perform could have been performed
by other occupational groups, had the bar been a smaller, more guild-
like occupation. Law would then have been a learned profession in
the narrow sense, with the boundaries of its competence sharply de-
fined. A small, proud, skillful-and expensive-profession, perhaps
on the order of English barristers, would have grown up. As things
turned out, however, a somewhat crudely trained, mobile bar and a
broad-based middle-class society emerged at the same time, with impor-
tant consequences for each other and for the law. Both lawyer and lay-
man, for example, demanded radical simplification of those aspects of
the legal system which came within their everyday experience. In a
society where thousands of ordinary citizens dealt in land, and thou-
sands of half-trained men were their land lawyers, the rococo excesses
of British land law were not tolerable. Perhaps one reason why Ameri-
can procedure was successfully reformed was that the public could not
trust its lawyers to maneuver through the classical arts of pleading.
At the same time, of course, the law was growing vastly more com-
plex; but its complexity was a consequence of complexity in the eco-
nomic sphere. This complexity gave rise to an urge for clarity and
pragmatic order in legal literature, and that was the impetus that sent
some lawyers rushing to their desks to write treatises. But the state of
the profession did not provide a climate conducive to the development
of formal jurisprudence. Nor did the bustling economy and its de-
mands on the legal profession lead to a radical, consistent difference
between the mind of the lawyer and that of the layman of similar
income and locale. The lawyer was very much a man enmeshed in
everyday affairs. It is likely that a complete study of the lawyers of
1800, 1830, or 1860 would show far fewer differences between the opin-
ions of lawyers and laymen than Professor Miller seems to think. A
thorough study would also have to abandon the notion of a monolithic
legal mind and recognize instead a set of minds, divided by region
(perhaps), by class (more likely), and probably also by size of town
and nature of practice. Or it would give up the notion of a legal mind
altogether, and choose instead to study the profession in context, admit-
ting into evidence the work of the lawyers in courtrooms, offices, and
in the streets, along with their higher flights of thought.
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